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12 March 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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State Dept. review completed

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UK - West Germany: [Prime Minister Wilson may have improved the climate for better relations between the UK and West Germany by easing Bonn's reservations about the Labor government during his recent trip to West Germany]

[Wilson was apparently able to reassure the Germans by expressing strong support for German reunification and by making clear that Labor's position on military disengagement in central Europe is not directed against Germany's interests]

[Bonn was especially pleased to obtain Wilson's approval of British participation in a new initiative by the four-power ambassadorial group on the reunification question. This group would also be asked to develop contingency plans to provide coordinated support for German foreign policies]

[Bonn, for its part, showed itself amenable to assuming a larger share of the burden in maintaining the British Army in Germany]

[The West Germans also were cautiously sympathetic to Wilson's desire to demonstrate progress on Britain's proposal for an Allied Nuclear Force, but were unwilling to risk antagonizing the French by taking new initiatives in the development of a multi-lateral nuclear force. Hence, the forum for discussions will continue to be the NATO Working Group in Paris]

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Guinea: [President Touré is the latest African leader to bring up charges of US plotting against his government]

[According to the Guinean defense minister, "high personalities" from France, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and at least one English-speaking African country have reported that the US is planning to assassinate Touré. The minister told the US Embassy in Conakry he was speaking in behalf of Touré]

[This may be an oblique bid for US support in the face of rising domestic pressure on Touré stemming from deteriorating economic conditions]

[The large Fulani tribe, traditionally privileged and generally more conservative than the regime, has been the object of several government crack-downs in recent months. The embassy has received several reports about Fulani plotting which may include plans to blame the US in the event of failure]

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Honduras: Convocation of the constituent assembly on 16 March will probably provide the occasion for an upsurge of violence.

Elements of the opposition Liberal Party, who have counseled moderation despite the government's rigging of the assembly elections last month, have been losing ground to the militants who are bent on overthrowing the regime. The recent rash of terrorist incidents suggests that the extremists may have already taken matters into their own hands.

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the Honduran Communist Party has at least two guerrilla bands in the mountainous north coast area, and they may be joined by certain disgruntled Liberals.

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Chief of State Lopez has expressed confidence that the army will be able to cope with guerrilla activity but past experience has shown that the army is relatively ineffective in rural areas.

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